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Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter
Competition: Lessons from Patents, Yachting and
Bluebooks
Ian Ayres·
A Dedication to Judge Logan
Judge James K. Logan has taught me a great deal about how to lead
a well-integrated professional life. My mind's ear can hear Judge
Logan's voice admonishing me to clear my desk of correspondence and
other chores before tackling the day's task of writing. I also hear Judge
Logan telling me to develop an expertise in one of the private law areas
so that my inclination for government intervention will. not be
marginalized for failure to consider the private reaction of the regulated.
Judge Logan takes tremendous interest in the lives of his clerks. He
showed us by example that there need not be a sharp dichotomy
between the professional and personal spheres. It was fitting that Judge
Logan married Jennifer Brown and me just two years ago in my
parents' house in Kansas City.
My clerkship also helped begin my academic career. Op-eds that I
unsuccessfully submitted to newspapers during my clerkship were I~ter
published in my first book,l and perverse Oklahoma precedent that
Judge Logan struggled to distinguish in one of his diversity cases
provoked me to write my first consumer-protection piece. 2
But most important, Judge Logan's example has taught me how to
live a responsible professional life. Judge Guido Calabresi (whose own
career has tracked Judge Logan's: moving from a deanship to the Court
of Appeals) has stressed the cumulative importance of small deeds.
• William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Law clerk to the Honorable
James K. Logan, 1986-87. Jennifer Brown, William Bratton, Jeremy Bulow, Paul David and
Roberta Romano provided helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was originally
presented at a conference on International Regulatory Competition and Coordination at the
University of Warwick.
\. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REsPONSIVE REGULATION 147-52 (1992).
2. The Oklahoma precedent, exemplified by Furrow v. First Nat'l Bank, 271 P. 632, 634
(Okla. 1928), held that misrepresentation of a seller's cost was not material because it had no
bearing on the current value of the property. In FDIC v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329, 1336-37 (lOth
Cir. 1987), Judge Logan distinguished the case from the Oklahoma precedent, finding that a
seller's misrepresentation was actionable in part because of the uncertain value of the property.
My analysis of these cases and markup disclosure in general can be found in Ian Ayres & F.
Clayton Miller, "I'll Sell It to You at Cost": Legal Methods to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure,
84 Nw. U. L. REv. 1047, 1049-52 (1990).
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Hannah Arendt has detailed the "banality of evil," but Judge Calabresi
has praised the "banality of good.") Judge Logan has excelled in the
banal details of professional life. To be sure he has participated in
many larger moments of heroism. In my year of clerking alone, Judge
Logan crafted opinions striking down both the per se exclusion of deaf
jurors from criminal cases4 and the per se exclusion of student corporal
punishment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.s
But to assess Judge Logan's professional righteousness merely by
looking at these heroic moments would miss a much larger picture. I
most admire Judge Logan's conscientious and empathetic struggle to
decide case after case, year after year. Each of his clerks has seen at
least one year of his consistent attentiveness to the duties of office.
This cumulative record of faithful service richly deserves to be honored.
This Article is dedicated to him.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing debate about whether Delaware's dominance in the
market for corporate charters is a race-to-the-top or a race-to-the-bottom
often turns on whether one believes corporate managers are driven to
incorporate (or reincorporate) in the state that provides the most
efficient law: William Cary and his followers have argued that
managers abuse their discretion to incorporate in states that benefit
managerial interests at the expense of shareholder interests;6 Ralph
Winter and his followers have argued that because managers' discretion
is constrained by promoters or by the threat of a potential takeover,
managers will tend to incorporate in states that provide laws which
maximize the value of corporate equity.7 Thus, in the end, much of the
debate about corporate competitive federalism turns out to be a question
3. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMAN IN JERUSALEM: A REpORT ON THE BANALITY
OF EVIL (1963). Judge Calabresi has used "banality of good" in several speeches.
4. United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084 (lOth Cir. 1987).
5. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
Logan's amended opinion was filed on May 6, 1987, but one indicia of the opinion's controversial
finding is that the United States Supreme Court did not deny the defendants' petition for a writ of
certiorari until March 21, 1988. The opinion has been subsequently criticized. See, e.g., Wise v.
Pea Ridge Sch. DisI., 855 F.2d 560, 563 n.4 (8th Cir. 1988).
6. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
LJ. 663 (1974).
7. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 1. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 222 (1991). Winter himself has
recently been careful to temper his earlier race-to-the·top thesis. Ralph K. Winter, The "&ce for
the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1526, 1528 (1989).
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about agency costs and whether these agency costs are constrained by
various forms of market discipline.
This Article explores different types of inefficiencies that may be
generated even if the managers faithfully try to maximize shareholders'
interests. Thus, the Article examines inefficiencies that might persist
even if firms were wholly owned by managers, so that there were no
separation of ownership from control. Extending Roberta Romano's
image that corporate statutory law is a "product" supplied by the
franchising state and purchased (as an input) by the firm,S this Article
focuses on supply-side inefficiencies, while the race-to-the-bottom
theorists of Cary's ilk focus on the demand-side failure of self-serving
managers to seek the corporate franchises in states which maximize
firm value.9
As Romano observes, both traditional race-to-the-top and race-to-the-
bottom theorists share a belief that racing states try to supply the legal
product demanded in the marketplace. lO And Romano was the first to
provide some evidence that speed of responsiveness was associated with
success in attracting corporate charters. The widely held belief that the
states respond quickly to changing demand is part of a general belief in
competitive federalism as a laboratory for democracy. But this Article
suggests that state competition may not efficiently respond to changes
in demand-even if we make the extreme assumption that managers
demand value-maximizing corporate law. II
This Article tells three different stories about why states might not
supply value-maximizing statutes. Besides focusing on supply-side
market failure, each of these stories is evolutionary in character in that
it focuses on the possible failure of competitive federalism to respond
to changing demands over time. It should also be stressed that my goal
is to merely explore the theoretical possibility of supply-side ineffi-
ciency; while I relate two of my stories to the development of anti-
takover legislation in the United States, I do not (for now) wish to
8. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product]; see also ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN TAKEOVER STATUTES (1993).
9. In an earlier article, I suggested that state legislatures would not compete to supply
efficient close-corporation law. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age ofStatutes, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 365,370-71 (1992). It is important to see that this was at heart a demand-side
theory because it argued that close corporations were unwilling for various structural reasons to
incorporate in foreign jurisdictions offering value-maximizing law.
10. Romano, Law as a Product. supra note 8, at 228.
II. While Romano was the first to show a positive correlation between responsiveness and
competitive success, Romano, Law as a Product. supra note 8, her evidence is insufficient to
establish that the states efficiently supply whatever is demanded.
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assess the extent to which these stories can be used to explain the actual
evolution of corporate governance.
Although this Article focuses on the possibility of market failure in
the supply of corporate charters, none of the stories amounts to a "race
to the bottom"---especially if that term takes on its original sense of
systematically selling out shareholder interests to further the interests of
management. Instead, the inefficiencies uncovered here suggest that
within the broad incentives that states have to supply the most desired
product there can be impediments along the way that forestall first-best
efficiency (or in Winter's original parlance a "race to the top"). These
models thus complement William Bratton's theory of corporate law's
race "to nowhere in particular."12
For convenience, I refer to these stories as patent, yachting and
bluebook models. The "patent" model suggests that individual states
may have insufficient incentives to innovate because statutory innova-
tions are not accorded intellectual-property protection. The "yachting"
model suggests that a dominant state such as Delaware may have
strategic incentives to mimic (or, in yachting terms, "cover") the
inefficient statutory innovations of other states. Finally, the "bluebook"
model suggests that a dominant state such as Delaware may have an
incentive to promulgate innocuous updates of its corporate statutes both
to create additional litigation for its attorneys and to increase the
difficulty of replication by competitor states.
This Article's focus on supply-side market failure is inspired in part
by the seminal work of Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller. While
previous analysis of competitive federalism stressed states' desire to
maximize charter revenues, Macey and Miller argue that states might
decide to indirectly extract some of the rents (for supplying desirable
corporate law) to benefit private interest groups within the
state-<:hiefly local bar members. 13 This interest-group distortion
represents one type of supply-side inefficiency that would obtain even
without any demand-side agency costs. This Article explores three
other types.
12. See William W. Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular (manuscript
1994).
13. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory ofDelaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469 (1987). Lucian Bebchuk's "externality" theory ofinefficient
competitive federalism also represents a supply-side theory in that inefficient law would be
produced even if corporations demand value-maximizing law. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism
and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 MARV.
L. REv. 1437 (1992).
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II. THE PATENT STORY
The simplest (but theoretically strongest) reason to believe that
innovations in corporate law will not occur at an efficient rate is that
innovations are not accorded the same kinds of protection that are
accorded to patents and other types of intellectual property.14 Individual
states have a reduced incentive to solve problems of corporate gover-
nance because successful statutory solutions may be quickly copied by
rival jurisdictions. Thus, even if state legislatures are engaged in a
race-to-the-top with respect to the creation of corporate law, there are
strong theoretical reasons to expect that the race will not proceed at an
efficiently fast pace.
A vivid example of the absence of patent protection can be seen in
the state competition for antitakeover statutes. In the 1980s there was
clearly a demand by at least some corporations for protection from
hostile takeovers. States encountered great difficulty trying to find a
statutory. formulation which would pass constitutional muster. IS
Attempts to formulate a constitutional statute were fraught with costs
because any antitakeover statute was sure to produce legal uncertainty
as the constitutionality of the statute was litigated. A state deciding
whether to pass a second- or third-generation antitakeover statute had
to weigh these costs against very limited competitive benefits. Even if
a state succeeded in articulating constitutional restrictions, other states
could immediately copy the sum and substance of their statute.
Indeed, this imitation occurred with lightening speed. Within a year
and one-half of the Supreme Court decision upholding the constitution-
ality of the Indiana antitakeover statute, twenty-six other states had
passed similar statutes. 16 Indiana and a few other innovating states bore
substantial costs in creating legal certainty, but gained virtually no
advantage in attempting to compete for corporate charters.
14. This idea was originally formulated in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 91. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). Ron Daniels
has applied this insight to the competition for corporate charters. Ronald 1. Daniels, Should
Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130,
149 (1991) ("Lacking a robust intellectual property regime, successful legal innovation can be
costlessly and quickly adopted by 'free-riding' jurisdictions. As a consequence, many of the
expected gains from successful legal products, in terms of enhanced market share, are denied to
innovating states.").
IS. The Supreme Court created the doubt about the constitutionality of state antitakeover
legislation with its 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), in which it held
that the Illinois Business Takeover Act violated the commerce clause.
16. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality ofindiana's "control share"
statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). Bill Carney details the
proliferation of antitakeover statutes in the wake of CTS. Bill Carney, The Political Economy of
Competition for Corporate Charters (manuscript, Nov. 14, 1994).
HeinOnline -- 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 546 1994-1995
546 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
Indiana's incentive to pass the statute ultimately did not tum on an
attempt to win more incorporations; rather, Indiana was merely trying
to protect an incumbent corporation from a hostile bid. 17 The fact that
this incentive was sufficient in this case provides no assurance that there
are sufficient incentives to experiment with other legal innovations.
Legal innovation is neither costless nor riskless. Because any state can
free-ride on the successful innovations of another state, there are
reduced incentives to bear the cost of innovation. Put simply, a strong-
form belief in competitive efficiency cannot coexist with the widely
held belief that free-riding undermines efficient investment. 18
This free-riding argument may do more than impede the speed of
innovation. As a theoretical matter, free-riding may impede a socially
valuable innovation from ever occurring. For example, Jennifer Brown
has recently argued that there may be a considerable legislative
incentive to be the first state to legalize same-sex marriages. 19 As a
practical matter, the first state that legalizes same-sex marriages will
probably not fear free-riding by other states because the political
opposition in other states to same-sex marriages will preclude imitation.
But it is possible to construct a counterfactual hypothetical in which no
state would legalize same-sex marriages even though all agreed it was
socially valuable.
Assume, for example, that legislatures believe it is equally likely that
legalization of same-sex marriages would produce a total of either $4 or $22
billion in tourism; but legislatures believe that moral repugnance of some of
their constituency to legalization is equivalent to a loss of $5 billion in
tourism.20
17. Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for
Corporate Charters, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 365, 373-76. See generally Roberta Romano, The
Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. III (1987).
18. This line of argument uses one cherished efficiency theory to undermine another
cherished theory. For similar arguments, see Ayres, supra note 9 (common-law efficiency theory
and race-to-the-top theory cannot both be true if we observe persistent disagreements between
court and legislative corporate-law making); Ian Ayres, Price and Prejudice, THE NEW REpUBLIC,
July 6, 1992, at 30 (quota theory is inconsistent with theory that employers will avoid disparate-
treatment claims for layoffs by failing to hire protected classes of workers initially).
19. Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriage, S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995).
20. Brown estimates that the present value of enhanced tourism might exceed $4 billion. Id.
The idea is that same-sex couples would travel to marry and honeymoon in the first state that
legalized same-sex unions. If more than one state legalized these unions, the total spent on
marriages and honeymoons might be reduced, but for the purposes of this hypothetical, I assume
that the potential tourism from same-sex marriages is a fixed amount (although it is initially
uncertain what the size of this amount would be).
This example also crucially assumes that a state is not harmed if its residents enter into same-
sex marriages under the law of another state. If this assumption fails, the legalization ofsame-sex
marriage might be viewed by other (nonlegalizing) states as a negative extemality.
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Even though legalization under a patent regime would produce an
expected gain of $8 billion,21 without patent protection no state would
want to be the first to legalize. If the tourism generated from legislation
turns out to be low, the state will lose the equivalent of $1 billion in
tourism. If the tourism generated is high, three other states would
quickly imitate by passing similar statutes.22 This ex-post imitation
would drive the initial state's share of tourism to $5.5 billion. As a
result of this free-riding, any state would expect to lose $1 billion if the
tourism demand was low and earn only one-half billion dollars if the
tourism demand was high. Thus, no state would likely be the first to
innovate.
The effect of this secondary competition is exacerbated if subsequent
states bear lower political costs in being the second, third or nth state
to recognize same-sex unions. (This might describe the political costs
associated with the subsequent state legalization of gambling.) Thus,
if subsequent states had to bear political costs equivalent to only a $2
billion loss in tourism, then no state would legalize even if it was clear
that there would be a high tourist demand for this new legal "product."
If tourism demand for same-sex marriages is known with certainty to
be $22 billion, a state considering whether to be the first to legalize
would expect ten additional states to legalize (so that each
state-including the initial state-would earn only $2 billion in
tourism). Realizing that this shared revenue would not cover the higher
first-mover costs (assumed to be $5 billion), each state would refuse to
move first.
While this example reductively has monetized the political opposition
to same-sex marriages,23 the example illustrates how the absence of
patent protection can destroy a state's incentive to be the first to engage
in a socially valuable innovation. In many competitive federalism
contexts there may only be an incentive to be a "second mover": racing
states will want another state to bear the first-mover costs, but will want
to be the second or subsequent state to innovate in order to garner a
larger portion of increased consumer demand.24
21. The expected revenue from legalization in a single state would be $13 billion [(22+4)12],
so the net expected revenue would be $8 billion (13-5).
22. Under these facts, no more than four states would legalize same-sex marriages. The
fourth state to legalize same-sex marriages would expect to earn one half billion dollars [(22/4)-5],
but a fifth state would expect to lose $600 million from legalization [(22/5)-5].
23. But see eass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv.
779 (\994) (discussing, among other things, the difficulties with assigning monetary amounts to
social values).
24. Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner have formalized the perverse consequences of such
"second-mover" incentives. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and
Innovation, 16 RAND 1. ECON. 70 (1985). Besides providing an explicit mathematical formulation,
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A crucial assumption in this marriage example is that second-movers
can react quickly and capture a pro-rata share of any tourism. Professor
Brown has shown, however, that in the context of same-sex marriage,
there will likely be an initial "pent-up" demand that will confer dispro-
portionate benefits on the first state to permit this category of marriage.
Moreover, in many other contexts the first-mover state will develop
expertise via a learning curve or a reputation that will give it a competi-
tive advantage over subsequent entrants.2S Moreover, in the same-sex
marriage context, the first-mover state may garner disproportionate
patronage if the tary,eted class of tourists remain grateful for the long-
awaited innovation. 6
The possibility of free-riding, therefore, does not necessarily destroy
the incentive to innovate first. After all, the same type of free-riding
has not chilled Marty Lipton's firm, the drafter of newfangled poison-
pill provisions, from innovating. But at least as a theoretical matter, the
same lack of intellectual-property protection might also dampen private
incentives to devise valuable contractual innovations. As Roberta
Romano has noted: "[F]irms may want not to customize their charters,
these authors have also illustrated this phenomena with the now-famous example of penguins:
Apparently penguins like to eat fish, but fear being eaten by walruses. As penguins crowd near
the water's edge it is optimal to be the second penguin to jump in. The first penguin discovers
whether a walrus is lurking beneath the surface, and the third (and subsequent) penguins have a
lower chance of finding fish. The second penguin has the highest expected payoff in trading off
the probabilities of finding fish and finding walruses. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
Competition. Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of Horses. Penguins and Lemmings,
in PRODUCT STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY I (H. Landis Gabel ed., 1987).
25. For example, Richard Schmalensee has shown that a "pioneering brand" may establish
a reputation that acts as a barrier to entry to others considering subsequent competition. Richard
Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 349
(1982) (detailing the role of brand loyalty in the market success of innovators). This is particularly
true if the product is an "experience good" that consumers cannot judge except through experience.
Jd. at 350. For example, if a first-mover brand for a new type of razors or bleach succeeds in
demonstrating to consumers that their product works, consumers may be reluctant to risk damaging
their body or their clothes with relatively untested products. Jd. In the corporate context, a state's
treatment of fiduciary-duty litigation (or other areas governed by "standards" instead of "rules")
may be just such an experience good that prevents subsequent competitors from easily capturing
a pro-rata share. Thus, we should expect the patentability problem to be greatest with regard to
innovative legal "rules" that might be easily replicated by other states. Many aspects of the
antitakeover statutes were rule-like. Thus, any competitive advantage that Indiana gained by
passing the first constitutional antitakeover statute was probably quickly dissipated by the
subsequent passage by other states.
26. Professor Brown points to the product loyalty that gay consumers have shown toward
Absolut Vodka because it was the first national advertizer to advertize in a gay publication.
Brown, supra note 19. Professor Brown also discusses the possibility that legalizing same-sex
marriages might induce long-lived enmity. Jd. Moreover, telephone consumers do not seem to
have shown any particular loyalty to MCI or Sprint for introducing discount telephone prices in
the United States.
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but to free ride on the innovative efforts of others. There would then
be a 'suboptimal' rather than 'superoptimal' level of charter devia-
tions.'>27 The open marketing of poison pills suggests that an important
part ofWachtell Lipton's service may have been not the ex-ante drafting
but the ex-post defense of the pill's validity. Just as Delaware's
advantage may stem more from its judicial servicing of its statute,
Wachtell Lipton's advantage may come from its being able to brag that
none of its pills has never been struck down. 28 The lesson of this patent
story, therefore, is not that statutory innovation is impossible, but
merely that some innovations will not occur. Other innovations will
occur, but not at a socially efficient speed. As seen with the anti-
~akeover statutes, some innovations will not be prompted by concerns
with interstate competition but instead merely by intrastate interest
group lobbying.
This patent story raises the possibility of a role for additional, but
limited federal intervention. The patent story underscores a fact that is
often obscured in race-to-the-top rhetoric: federal law must play a
crucial role in creating the conditions for competitive federalism. In the
corporate context, there could -be no statutory competition if the United
States Supreme Court did not prohibit (or limit) the ability of non-
franchising states. to regulate the internal affairs of corporations incorpo-
rated in other states.29 The patent story suggests that even adherents of
the race-to-the-top theory might want the federal government to go
further in creating the preconditions for efficient competition.
Specifically, Congress might be called upon to preempt other states
from imitating (free-riding on) the statutory innovations of a competing
state for a limited number of years. Preempting states from imitating
the statutory innovations of sibling states would not discriminate among
the individual states from an ex-ante perspective. Even though that
preemption would restrain some states' legislative freedom once an
innovation had occurred, ex-ante there is no discrimination by this form
of patent protection because each state has an equal legal opportunity
to engage in the innovation.30
27. Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory
Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1599, 1603 (1989).
28. However, savvy rivals may have been able to free-ride on even this reputational capital.
Other law firms that plagiarized the Wachtell Lipton pill might be able to expect that Wachtell
Lipton would be willing to donate its services to defend the pill's validity so that an unfavorable
precedent would not be created.
29. If nonfranchising states could impose their local regulations concerning internal
governance, there would be no incentive for a corporation headquartered in Missouri to incorporate
in Delaware. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at
298-301 (1991).
30. The same-sex marriage example poses a much harder constitutional issue because patent-
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In the end, it might certainly be true that the costs of implementing
this new type of preemption might not be worth the candle; federal
legislators or an administrative agency might abuse quasi-patenting
power to constrain competition. But before we dismiss this form of
federal intervention out-of-hand as an example of the "nirvana
fallacy,"31 it is useful to compare the generally accepted success of the
patent office.32 This patent story is useful because it probes the limits
of the "law as a product" image33 of corporate statutes. If corporate
statutes are really like products, the idea of giving patent protection to
true' innovations should not provoke such a visceral gag reflex.
Arguments against giving states intellectual-property protection quickly
run the risk of proving too much.
III. THE YACHTING STORY
The last section argued that the patent inefficiencies might lead to too
little legal innovation. Other supply-side inefficiencies, however, may
lead to too much legal change. This section explores a yachting model
that generates inefficient innovation and argues that it might capture
some elements of corporate charter competition.
like preemption would foreclose competing states from extending this basic civil right to its
citizenry for a limited number of years. The crucial constitutional issue, however, is whether
same-sex marriage is a basic civil right. Currently, no court has accorded this civil right a
constitutional status, but see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1994), so preempting some states
from legalizing same-sex unions would likely be constitutional if one concluded that Congress
could preclude all states from legalizing these unions.
Indeed, besides this targeted preemption, it might be appropriate for federal intervention to
boost the value of the patent. Just as nonfranchising states are required to recognize the
incorporations of other states, it might be useful to force nonsolemnizing states to'recognize the
validity of same-sex unions under either a constitutional full-faith-and-credit analysis or by
preempting the individual states from promulgating choice-of-Iaw rules in derogation of such
recognition. See Brown, supra note 19 (discussing choice-of-Iaw rules).
31. For a description of the nirvana fallacy, see Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More
Fun? A Reexamination o/the Debate Over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. I, 5I n.ll6 ("[f]he existence of costs is taken as sufficient grounds for branding an
arrangement suboptimal without considering the feasibility of alternative arrangements.").
32. At the very least, economic scholars have difficulty pointing to clear errors with the broad
outlines of the patent system. See, e.g., Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the
Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(Mitchel B. Wallerstein et at. eds., 1993); George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers
About Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, 8 REs. L. & ECON. 19, 19-21 (John Palmer &
Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986).
33. Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 8.
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The essence of this competitive inefficiency can be gleaned from a
two-yacht race (such as the America's Cup) by analyzing the optimal
strategies of the yachts in the middle of the race at a point when one
boat has gained a lead over the other. Before proceeding to the
specifics of this story, let me caution the reader that I was born and
raised as far inland as possible in the United States, and my knowledge
of yachting is less than rudimentary. The following should be
interpreted as a fable that might illuminate other contexts even if it does
not accurately describe yachting.
The efficient direction to steer the boat (the efficient "tack") is
determined by the direction of the prevailing winds in conjunction with
the direction of the destination. One might expect both boats to choose
the efficient tack, but in many race contexts neither boat chooses this
tack in a competitive equilibrium. Even if the leading boat is taking the
efficient tack, the trailing boat may choose to steer in another direction
hoping that the wind will change to favor this new direction. The
trailing boat reasons that if it takes the same tack as the lead boat, it
will have no chance of gaining on the lead boat because, assuming both
boats are equally seaworthy, both will take advantage of the same wind.
Even though an inefficient tack increases the expected time it will take
to finish the race, the inefficient tack can increase the trailing yacht's
chance of victory because, if the wind changes in its favor, the trailing
yacht will gain ground on the lead yacht.
The leading yacht often does not ignore this perverse strategy of the
trailing yacht. Indeed, lead yachts often choose to "cover" the trailing
yacht by mimicking the tack of the trailing yacht.34 As long as the lead
yacht efficiently covers the trailing yacht so that both boats uniformly
present themselves to the wind, then the trailing yacht will not have an
opportunity to gain ground. Of course, once the .lead yacht covers the
trailing yacht's inefficient tack, the trailing yacht will have an incentive
34. See, e.g., Bob Fisher, Sailing: All-Woman Crew Routs Connor, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 14,
1995, at 19 (first-place boat "tacked to cover" second-place boat).
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to "come about," changing directions back to the efficient tack.3s A
















Figure 1: The perverse yachting incentives
for inefficient tacking and cover.
35. Inefficient tacking by the trailing yacht and inefficient cover by the leading yacht can
also be induced when the wind is coming from behind two yachts so that the trailing yacht (yacht
B) can create a "wind blanket" which slows the speed of the leading yacht (yacht A).
By changing course to windward, yacht A could gain speed and sail out of yacht B's
wind blanket, although, of course, yacht A might no longer be sailing the rhumb line
to the next mark. . .. If B also jibes, A may have to sail even higher, or perhaps jibe
again and sail away from B in order to keep her wind clear. This maneuver may have
to be repeated a number of times. Take care, however, that a third competitor, sailing
a straight line course to the next mark, does not pass or gain significantly while yachts
A and B are dueling. . .. rrlhe yacht astern, or behind, becomes the attacking yacht
and determines to a great extent the tactics the leading yacht must employ-and the
course she must sail ....
MANFRED CURRY'S RACING TACTICS 283 (revised by Edward J. Cox & Edward D. Muhlfeld,
1963~ .
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At time 1 (T.), the trailing yacht (yacht B) turns to an inefficient tack
(tack right) and the leading yacht (yacht A) turns immediately (at time
T).) to cover. At time 2 (T2), yacht B turns back to the efficient tack
(tack left) and yacht A again turns as soon as it can (at time T2.) to












Figure 2: A Matrix Depiction of this Cycling
Equilibrium
This rivalry is depicted in a more traditional game-theoretic fashion
in Figure 2. If we start in the upper-left quadrant in which both yachts
are taking the efficient (fast) tack, then the trailing yacht has a strong
incentive to change directions to the inefficient tack: in this example,
changing directions hoping that the wind will shift doubles the trailing
yacht's probability of victory from ten to twenty percent. The figure
also depicts the leading yacht's incentive to "cover" even inefficient
tacks, as can be seen in the leading yacht's incentive to move from the
lower-left to the lower-right quadrant. Even though taking an ineffi-
cient tack increases its expected time, it perversely increases the leading
yacht's probability of victory because it reduces the probability that the
trailing yacht will benefit from a shift in the wind. Once the lead yacht
covers the inefficient tack, the trailing yacht now has a particularly
strong incentive to switch directions back to the efficient tack because
the prevailing winds will give it the advantage. This incentive is
depicted in the figure by the reduction in the leading boat's probability
of victory to sixty percent. Of course, the upper-right quadrant is not
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an equilibrium because the leading yacht will once again strive to cover,
moving us back to the upper-left quadrant. The yachts are likely to
cycle counterclockwise through the strategies represented in the four
. quadrants.
Because of the leading yacht's strong incentive to cover even
inefficient tacks, the trailing yacht controls the direction of both boats
in many yacht races. This yachting rivalry is a classic example of a
discoordination game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies. Just
as in the child's game of matching pennies, one player (the leading
yacht) wants to match the other's strategy, while the other player (the
trailing yacht) wants to choose a nonmatching strategy.36 Moreover, the
strategic interaction leads to excessive changes in direction (zigzagging)
and significantly slower times.
While I would like to apply this yachting fable to the competition for
corporate charters, the differences between these contexts are so vast
that I readily admit that the entire enterprise is fraught with danger. 37
Most important, the leading yacht's incentive for inefficient cover
quickly breaks down if more than two yachts are racing. With two
trailing yachts, it may become impossible to cover both, so it is more
likely for the leading yacht to cleave to the efficient tack. However,
even here the leading yacht will often cover the most threatening
competitor (or at least partially cover by tacking somewhere in between
this competitor's tack and the efficient tack).
Also, it is important to see that unlike the patent story, the yachting
story generates a first-mover advantage for innovation. For the story to
make strategic sense, the trailing yacht must be able to benefit from
already being pointed in the correct direction relative to the changing
wind (possibly because it takes time for the leading yacht to come
about). But the first-mover incentive is to innovate inefficiently: the
strategy of the trailing yacht (the first-mover) is to tack against the wind
(inefficient). This causes the leading yacht to cover the inefficient tack,
and this slows the speed of both boats.
This yachting story has two important predictions for corporate law:
(l) inefficient innovation by trailing states and (2) inefficient cover by
Delaware (the prototypical leading yacht). It is important to stress
again, however, that the first half of the story will only occur if the
trailing state can benefit from being the first to adopt an innovation that
may become valuable. In the corporate context, even without patent-
ability there might be a first-mover advantage with regard to legal
36. Eric Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 309 (1993).
37. For example, yacht races produce all-or-nothing payoffs for the participants, while
competitive federalism admits many degrees of success.
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innovations that are more valuable after judges have experience in their
application. A judicial "learning curve" explanation or reputational
advantage may create the necessary type of first-mover advantage.
A trailing state trying to attract some of Delaware's corporate
clientele to reincorporate might choose to adopt innovations that might
become necessary only in the future. Some of Pennsylvania's vaunted
efforts to compete might be seen as trying to innovate ahead of the
corporate demand. The first important lesson of the yachting model is
that absent competition some states may have chosen to wait until more
information about demand had developed. Of course, absent competi-
tion states might generally be lackadaisical about providing the laws
that their chartered corporations demand. However, the yachting story
suggests that competition may cause some states to inefficiently '~ump
the gun" in search of a potentially valuable future innovation.
Moreover, the story suggests that this premature innovation should not
come from Delaware but from those trailing states that are trying to vie
with Delaware for charter revenues.
Ultimately, the ease of copying statutory innovations may undermine
the yachting incentive for introducing changes too quickly and, as
argued above, lead to the inefficiently slow statutory innovation.
However, the second implication of the yachting story-predicting
"inefficient cover"-may have vitality even if yachting-like incentives
do not explain the legislative behavior of the trailing states. Specifi-
cally, I would argue that inefficient cover may help explain one of the
central conundrums for race-to-the-top adherents: Delaware's passage
of antitakeover legislation.
Because the antitakeover legislation was so clearly inefficient,
Easterbrook and Fischel have openly been at pains to explain its
passage.38 The private-interest-group theory explains the passage of
antitakeover legislation in other states,39 but is not as plausible in
Delaware which has more diffuse and nonresident corporate constitu-
ents.
But Delaware's passage of the antitakeover legislation is consistent
with the yachting model (even in its multiboat incarnation). After
twenty-six other states (including all of its closest rivals) passed
antitakeover legislation, Delaware had a strong incentive to cover. As
long as corporations demand antitakeover legislation, Delaware, by
covering, can reduce or eliminate a reason for these corporations to
migrate from the state. Delaware may be moving in an inefficient
38. See EAsTERBROOK & FISCHEL; supra note 7, at 219-23; Ian Ayres, Making a Difference:
The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, S9 U. CHI. L. REv. 1391 (1992).
39. In the trailing states, antitakeover statutes were passed to aid particular incumbent
takeover targets. See Romano, supra note 17, at 120-21; Butler, supra note 17, at 366-68.
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direction by adopting antitakeover legislation, but because so many of
its rivals have already moved in this direction, Delaware reduces the
chance of giving up part of its dominance by following suit. Indeed,
the fact that Delaware's covering was only partial is also consistent with
the model: in multiyacht races, the leading yacht often compromises
between the efficient tack and the covering tack.40
The inefficient-cover prediction certainly cannot explain all of
Delaware's behavior. Roberta Romano has found: "With regard to
most major corporate law reforms, ... Delaware was the first or second
state to act.'041 More work can be done, however, to examine the cases
in which Delaware has chosen to follow instead of lead. 42 Indeed, the
analysis of this section suggests that the decision to follow may
constitute prima facie evidence that the innovation was premature.
IV. THE BLUEBOOK STORY
While the yachting story predicted excessive innovation by trailing
states, we now explore the possibility of excessive innovation by the
dominant competitor. The metaphor for this model is A Uniform
System of Citation-eommonly known as the "bluebook.'043 The
bluebook sets out a number of rules for legal citation in law reviews
and other types of legal writing. The bluebook is published by a
40. This inefficient-cover story represents an alternative to Professor Eisenberg's theory that
Delaware was responding to a threat of federal intervention. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure
of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1512 (1989). The federal preemption story, like
the yachting story, suggests that Delaware would "avoid taking the lead in the adoption of rules
favoring managers at the shareholder's expense." Bratton, supra note 12, at 30. Under both
theories, Delaware is a follower: not necessarily the last to innovate, but not the leader. But while
Eisenberg's theory suggests that Delaware would fear preemption, the inefficient-cover theory
suggests that Delaware might have welcomed federal preemption that reifies its lead.
41. Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover
Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 843, 855 (1993).
42. For example, it should be possible to use the data of.BiII Carney to analyze how quickly
Delaware acted in passing a broad variety of reforms that have had broad market penetration. See
Carney, supra note 16.
43. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (15th ed. 1991). To nonlegal scholars
in the United States, the term "blue book" is often used to refer to a listing of used-car prices.
See. e.g., KELLY BLUE BOOK (1994). This used-car "blue book" is updated periodically to reflect
possible changes in wholesale and retail prices for used cars. The same excessive innovation
strategy described in this section may surprisingly affect this publication as well. The used-car
blue book may earn additional revenues when it publishes a new edition because many market
participants want to trade based on authoritative information. The authors of this dominant series
thus may have a perverse incentive to have too many updates; even if it would be socially optimal
to have updates only annually or semiannually, they may make more money if they update
quarterly.
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consortium of four elite law reviews44 who require that its rules be
observed in their publications. Possibly because of the dominance of
these law reviews in the academy, the vast majority of law reviews
across the United States require that all published citations conform to
the bluebook's rules.4s Most first-year law students must buy the
bluebook and study its mandates.46
I would like to suggest that the law reviews that publish the bluebook
have an incentive to engage in excessive innovation. This is not a
prediction of a race-to-the-bottom, but a prediction of excessive innocu-
ous change. The inefficiency. comes in the need to learn arbitrary new
rules, not in the quality of the rules themselves. The bluebook
publishers have this perverse incentive because every new edition of the
bluebook generates a large one-time demand as lawyers and legal
libraries are driven to buy the authoritative source. It is not surprising
that the bluebook is now in its fifteenth edition. Of course there may
be pressing aesthetic reasons why a certain reference needs to be put in
large and small capital letters instead of italics,47 but along with these
aesthetics is the knowledge that each new edition will reap an economic
windfall.48
Lest law students be singled out for abuse, let me stress that the same
kind of incentive leads to excessive innovation with regard to law
professors' revisions of textbooks. Producing a new edition with only
superficial changes can increase sales because students can no longer
rely on outdated "used" books.49 This incentive for excessive innocuous
innovation 'can succeed even in the face of competition from other
casebooks. Even though each arbitrary new edition requires adopting
professors to engage in additional teaching preparation-in part to find
out what has been changed-teachers will often stay with the textbook
44. The editors of the Columbia Law Review, the Harvard Law ReView, the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review and The Yale Law Journol compile the citation rules.
45. For example, the Kansas Law Review requires that its authors comply.
46. The bluebook has one rival in the legal marketplace of ideas-the "maroon book" which
springs from the University of Chicago. See THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO MANUAL OF LEGAL
CITATION (1989); Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1343 (1986).
However, the market penetration to date of the late-comer is relatively slight.
47. Some changes in new editions legitimately seem to be prompted by changes in
technology (viz., rules regarding citation of computer databases) or changes in social norms (viz.•
increased references to first names responding in part to patriarchal determination of last names).
48. The bluebook story points more generally to the fact that arbiters of fashion have
incentives for excessive innocuous intervention. This might be exemplified not only by the annual
fall fashions, but also by Dr. Seuss's fable of the star-bellied sneeches. See DR. SEUSS (THEOOOR
S. GEISEL & AUDREY S. GEISEL). THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES (1961). Unfortunately.
I do not have a well-developed theory of how one becomes an arbiter of fashion.
49. To make this strategy effective it is important that the early materials be changed
sufficiently so that the new edition has different page references.
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that has been modified rather than switch to an entirely new casebook.
A dominant producer is most likely to engage in excessive innocuous
innovation when incumbent users will face higher "switching costs" in
switching to another manufacturer than in merely accepting an
innocuously "new and improved" edition of the same manufacturer.so
Another example of excessive innocuous change might be found in
the computer software industry, Although there are competitive types
of software, incumbent users often find it easier to learn the new rules
governing an upgrade than to switch to an entirely new type of
software. And incumbent users may be forced to buy an innocuous
upgrade to maintain compatibility with other users. Although upgrade
competition in this dynamic industry seems to be primarily driven by
legitimate technological innovation, manufacturers may have an
incentive to innovate merely to generate additional revenues from
selling upgrades.·
Moreover, the process of upgrading may itself enhance consumers'
switching cost. If software competitors are trying to develop, compati-
ble software which can be used in conjunction with a dominant brand,
then that dominant brand may have incentives to introduce arbitrary
innovations making it more difficult for rivals to achieve compatibility.
Put simply, it is harder to imitate a moving target. For example, it
would not be surprising if one of the motivating factors behind a Lotus
upgrade was a desire to make it more difficult for incumbent users to
switch to Quattro Pro. It is rumored that the mantra for the Windows
development team at Microsoft was: "It's not done until Lotus won't
run." In other words, Lotus incompatibility was one of the means of
giving Microsoft's Excel spreadsheet a competitive advantage. sl
Among many legitimate motivations, Delaware may similarly be
moved to enact innocuous and arbitrary amendments to its corporate
law in order to generate additional rents and make its code more
difficult to copy. Extending the thesis of Macey and Miller,s2 the
Delaware bar may prefer seemingly innocuous change that gives rise to
additional litigation. New statutes often give rise to an initial wave of
clarifying litigation so that the Delaware bar (much like the bluebook
editors) may have an additional incentive to lobby for statutory change.
50. See generally Paul Klemperer, Centre for Economic Policy Research Working Paper No.
704, Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview (1992) (providing
examples of switching costs and describing their effects in the market); Paul Klemperer, Markets
with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1987) (describing use of switching costs
to increase future profits).
5I. I thank Peter Cramton for telling me this rumor.
52. Macey & Miller, supra note 13.
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Statutory modification may also make it more difficult for other states
to develop copycat legislation. For example, although Nevada explicitly
attempted to incorporate Delaware standards into its corporate gover-
nance, amendments to the Delaware code force other states to contin-
ually try to catch up. Even innocuous differences between Delaware's
code and that of other states may be sufficient to deter migration from
the dominant state if corporate counsel have difficulty evaluating (or
pricing) individual statutory components. As a result, Delaware may
have an incentive to differentiate its product for the sake of differentia-
tion itself. Innovating to increase the difficulty of imitation might even
be one of the consequences of nonpatentability. Because Delaware
cannot patent its legitimate innovations to prevent imitation, it may be
driven to engage in other inefficient statutory changes to help protect its
intellectual property.
This bluebook story is more ephemeral than the patent or yachting
stories. I have not tied the analysis to any particular statutory amend-
ment in Delaware. But the plausibility of the phenomena in the
publishing of other authoritative standards-whether it be bluebooks,
textbooks or software-suggests that the phenomena may play an
analogous role in "publishing" new editions of the Delaware corporate
code. This is particularly true because, unlike private publishers,
Delaware does not have to worry that users will continue to use the
prior edition. For example, users of the WordPerfect software were at
least initially reluctant to switch from the earlier version to version 6.0.
Private publishers face an additional constraint in producing innocuous
innovations because the user-base may stick with the prior standard.
Delaware, as a publisher of law, does not face this constraint because
its amendments invalidate the use of prior law. While Wordperfect
users can continue to use version 5.1 (eschewing the bug-laden
improvements ofversion 6.0), Delaware corporate users cannot continue
to use version 1987 once version 1994 becomes authoritative.53
The bluebook story thus predicts that Delaware will innovate first.
And while this seems to accord with facts, the bluebook story by itself
does not explain why trailing states would want to imitate the innocuous
innovations. This is a serious weakness of the model. It is possible
that states might copy even needless innovations for fear that divergence
from Delaware on innocuous provisions would make it more difficult
for them to compete with Delaware to retain their current base of
53. If the amendments merely establish a new default with regard to some aspect of corporate
governance, then corporations could reestablish the prior governance by contracting around the
amendment. Elsewhere I have argued that even a change between two default rules may produce
nontrivial corporate effects because private parties may have difficulty privately establishing
standard-like governance as easily as the state. Ayres, supra note 36.
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incorporations. The idea here is that counsel of corporations incorpo-
rated elsewhere would need to understand the intricacies of Delaware
law in order to engage in transactions with the great number of
Delaware corporations. Compatibility with Delaware is so important
that corporate codes that differ from Delaware's may become dis-
favored. While this provides a possible explanation for why trailing
states would mimic the innocuous innovations of Delaware, I have not
been able to conjure striking statutory examples of Delaware innova-
tions that seem to be motivated by a desire to attract the additional
revenues that arise from unsettled law. In the end, the bluebook story
is presented here more as an additional example of how strategic
inefficiencies in the supply of real products can illuminate our under-
standing of competitive federalism.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that even if corporations demand value-
maximizing law, supply-side inefficiencies may prevent a strong-form
version of the race-to-the-top theory. The supply-side incentives
crucially depend upon whether a state may benefit from being the first
to promulgate an innovation (and even more particularly upon whether
Delaware has the same incentive to innovate as competitor states).
Federal law plays an important role in establishing the parameters for
state competition. Particularly, the federal rules controlling statutory
patentability will affect whether there is a first-mover advantage to
value-maximizing innovations. A distressing implication of these
models is that it is not clear whether or how federal law should promote
such an advantage. The patent story showed that the absence of a first-
mover advantage could give rise to one type of inefficiency, while the
yachting and bluebook stories suggest that first-mover advantages could
give rise to other types of inefficiencies. As in other areas, policy-
makers and scholars need to choose judiciously among competing
models on the basis of the models' falsifiable predictions.54
The supply-side inefficiencies described in these models are at odds
with the simplest models of industrial organization. Our first economic
intuition is that competitors should supply the kind of goods the
marketplace demands. Even monopolists usually have an incentive to
supply the efficient quality: monopolists price inefficiently, but they
want to produce efficiently (i.e., supply the qualities that consumers
demand) so that they can maximize their markup.
54. See Richard Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon
Case, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 994,995 (1979).
..
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However, these intuitions are qualified when a finn must produce a
single type of product for heterogeneous competitors. A seminal article
by Michael Spence pointed out that, given the monopoly overcharge, a
monopolist choosing a single quality would have an incentive to choose
a quality that was preferred by "marginal" consumers who are indiffer-
ent between purchasing or not.55 Tying product quality to the prefer-
ences of marginal consumers can be inefficient if the average (or
"inframarginal") consumer prefers a different type of product.
The Spencian model is instructive because it illustrates that producers
may have incentives to supply products with a socially inefficient
quality. But the Spence result only holds if producers are constrained
to produce a limited number of products;56 otherwise, the savvy
producer would supply different types of products to satisfy the
different types of demand. The Spencian model is thus consistent with
the specialization thesis of Richard Posner and Kenneth Scott-that
different states might specialize in providing corporate statutes for
different types of corporations-because states would only need to
specialize in providing a particular type of corporate franchise if
providing multiple types of governance were infeasible. 57
As applied to corporate law, this Spencian logic suggests that:
"Reincorporating finns are this market's marginal consumers. . .. The
market causes the states to focus on the variables that influence
reincorporation decisions."58 Roberta Romano's empiricism suggests a
way to test this theory. Romano identified particular types of finns that
are most likely to reincorporate. Delaware may not have incentives to
supply the demands of its many inframarginal consumers who are
sufficiently satisfied with Delaware corporate governance and therefore
unlikely to change--even if several parts of the code fail to provide
efficient law. In future work, I hope to identify the parts of the code
and the types of corporations that theory predicts would be neglected in
Delaware's attempt to choose the product quality that will maximize its
rents.59
55. A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417,417-18
(1975).
56. In Spence's original model, the fixed costs of producing different product types
constrained the number of products. [d.
57. RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH SCon-, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAw AND
SECURITIES REGULATION (1980); see also Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of
Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985).
58. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Self-Regulation in the Political Economy of Corporate Law (manuscript, July II,
1994).
59. An initial part of this research argued that close corporations were inframarginal
consumers in the sense that their choice of jurisdiction was not sensitive to differences in
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Roberta Romano's insight that law can be thought of as a product
invites a broader application of the industrial-organization theory about
the determinants of product quality. To date, corporate scholars have
only scratched the surface of this rich literature, detailing the possibility
of subtle strategic inefficiencies. Arbitrage between these two academic
markets seems particularly appropriate.
substantive corporate rules. Ayres, supra note 9. As a result, I suggested that Delaware and other
states had diluted incentives to provide value-maximizing law for these firms. This future research
would extend the insights of Lucian Bebchuk. See Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1452, 1454.
